The Injury Industry and the Remedy of No-Fault Insurance, by Jeffrey O\u27Connell by Thorpe, Philip C.
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 47 | Issue 3 Article 9
Spring 1972
The Injury Industry and the Remedy of No-Fault
Insurance, by Jeffrey O'Connell
Philip C. Thorpe
Indiana University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Insurance Law Commons, and the Torts Commons
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Law
School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Thorpe, Philip C. (1972) "The Injury Industry and the Remedy of No-Fault Insurance, by Jeffrey O'Connell," Indiana Law Journal: Vol.
47: Iss. 3, Article 9.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol47/iss3/9
BOOK REVIEWS
THE INJURY INDUSTRY AND THE REMEDY OF No-FAULT INSURANCE.
By Jeffrey O'Connell. Chicago: Commerce Clearing House, Inc.
1971. Pp. xiii, 253. $8.50.
For a number of years Professor Jeffrey O'Connell has investigated
and criticized the traditional methods used to compensate traffic accident
victims. As coauthor with Professor Robert Keeton of Basic Protection
for the Traffic Victim: A Blueprint for Reforming Automobile In-
surance,' a book containing a proposal popularly called the Keeton-
O'Connell plan, O'Connell has played a major role in geperating
interest in reform and in developing proposals to achieve it. In his
latest book, The Injury Industry and the Remedy of No-Fault In-
surance,2 O'Connell abandons his roles as investigator, critic and designer
and adopts those of advocate and polemicist. He carries his case to
the general public in an effort to stimulate support for the reform
for which he long has labored.3 Unfortunately, O'Connell's efforts as
polemicist and advocate do not achieve the performance level he has
consistently attained in his other roles. The Injury Industry is a super-
ficial and misleading work, one which does credit neither to the man
nor to the cause he serves.
The book's title suggests both the superficiality and misleading
nature of its contents. O'Connell has written an expos6 of what he
labels "the injury industry." The "industry" to which he refers consists
of the major opponents of no fault insurance reform: insurance com-
panies and organized bar groups. The author's thesis is simple. Since
the fault system operates unfairly and inefficiently, it does a poor job of
compensating victims of motor vehicle accidents. O'Connell argues that
no fault insurance would provide better and fairer compensation more
efficiently than does the fault system. He accuses the injury industry of
having a financial stake in retaining the fault system and, therefore, he
is suspect of its opposition to no fault reform.' Insofar as he attacks the
1. R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VIcTIM: A.
BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (1965) [hereinafter cited as KEETON
& O'CONNELL].
2. J. O'CONNELL, THE INJURY INDUSTRY AND THE REMEDY OF NO-FAULT
INSURANCE (1971) [hereinafter cited as THE INJURY INDUSTRY].
3. See, e.g., id. at 1-8.
4. See, e.g., id. at 37-38.
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credibility of the opposition, O'Connell is adopting a new tactic for
advocating no fault reform-impeachment through proof of interest and
bias..
One feels a good deal of sympathy for no fault advocates like
O'Connell. For several years their efforts have been frustrated because
their opponents have ignored the evidence, failed to confront the issues
and, worst of all, belittled the efforts of individuals like O'Connell by
dismissing no fault reform as the aberration of cloistered academicians.'
By idealizing fault, the opponents of no fault have disregarded the
merits of reform. They have constructed arguments from premises which
can be disproved historically, logically or empirically. No fault opponents
have made a fetish of deterrence despite overwhelming evidence that
negligence law does not and cannot prevent most vehicular accidents.
They have argued for retention of general damages without confronting
the economic and social costs that such a reparative goal demands. Thus,
one can understand and forgive a display of exasperation by the no
fault advocates. Since the opposition to no fault insurance has come
largely from two groups that have a financial interest in motor vehicle
accident claims, insurers and the bar, it is easy to understand why
O'Connell attributes opposition to no more than an unwillingness to
relinquish a lucrative system. Unfortunately, his impeachment of no
fault opponents, besides seeming irrelevant to the merits of the argument,
is seriously misleading. His injury industry is a straw man.
By coining the phrase "the injury industry" and attacking it so
vehemently, O'Connell misleads his reader in two ways. Initially, he
misrepresents the roles played by insurers and attorneys within the
context of the present compensation system. More importantly, however,
he misstates their roles under a no fault plan. O'Connell attacks the injury
5. Examples of arguments in opposition to no fault insurance of the type
described may be found in almost every issue of the magazine published by the
American Trial Lawyers Association. See, e.g., No-Fault Plans "First Aid"--"Major
Surgery" Needed, TRIAL, Nov./Dec., 1971, at 5; Lewis, As I See It, id. at 8, Nothing
Wrong in. Principle Can Be Right in Practice, id. at 9; Spangenberg, The Federal No
Fault Plan: Benefits for Sale, id. at 30; Ring, Illinois No Fault Plan: Legalized
Consumer Fraud, id. at 34; Schwartz, The Fair Pay Plan: Fair Play for Consumers,
id. at 39. These articles represent an extreme. They should be compared with other
studies which are more carefully documented and better reasoned. See, e.g., W. BLUm
& H. Kalven, Jr., PUBLIC LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PRavATE LAW PROBLEM: AUTO
COMPENSATION PLANS (1965) [hereinafter cited as BLUm & KALVEN]; G. CALABRESI,
THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970) [hereinafter
cited as CALABRESI]; A. CONARD, J. MORGAN, R. PRAATr, JR., C. VOLTz & R. BOMBAUGH,
AUTOmOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS: STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF
INJURY REPARATION (1964); KEETON & O'CONNELL, supra note 1; H. Ross, SETTLED
OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENTS (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Ross].
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industry because it profits from adjusting and litigating claims under the
fault system. This, of course, is true. He also argues, quite correctly, that
if litigation is unnecessary the major beneficiaries of the present system
are the litigators, not the claimants. Further, he assumes that litigation
concerning fault or negligence is unnecessary-an assumption subject
to considerable debate.' Even if we concede that such an assumption is
a plausible social judgment, O'Connell still misrepresents the situation.
The adoption of no fault insurance will eliminate neither the institution
of insurance nor the need to adjust claims. Indeed, no fault insurance
merely alters the relationships among insurer, insured, victim and the
legal system. Victims will continue to be compensated from one or more
sources of funds which will have to be raised through payment of
premiums or taxes. An apparatus must be provided to collect from one
and distribute to another. This apparatus, together with medical personnel,
hospitals, police and other persons and groups involved in providing
care for accident victims, is and will remain the injury industry.
O'Connell's attack upon insurance companies and the bar is unwar-
ranted. If his injury industry has been half as selfish and unjust as he
suggests, it deserves exposure, condemnation and regulation or elimina-
tion. However, there is no such industry in the pejorative sense he
implies. There is, indeed, an extensive apparatus for adjusting claims
and raising funds to make payments. The apparatus has grown rapidly
and may not be functioning as efficiently and fairly as it might. It needs
adjustment, overhaul or redesigning. This may necessitate adopting
some form of no fault insurance. Nevertheless, the complexities of
victim claims cannot be eliminated. Many no fault plans rely upon
several devices simultaneously to provide compensation. Coverage dis-
putes will be increased. Periodic payment of benefits will give rise to
disputes over termination of benefits. There will still be many ,disputed
points and ample opportunity for systemic malfunctions under a-no fault
plan.
Besides misleading his reader about these points, O'Connell also
misconceives the proper role of dispute in checking malfunctioning.
O'Connell argues that no fault insurance would reduce litigation by
reducing the number of "decision points."7 Since litigation is time con-
suming and expensive, a reduction in disputes would provide major
advantages. This argument, however, raises serious questions of its own.
Under the present system, claimaits' attorneys act as a check upon
6. See, e.g., BLUm & KALVEN, supra note 5; CALABREsI, supra note 5.
7. THE INJURY INDUSTRY, supra note 2, at 154; see J. FRANK, AMERICAN LAW:
THE CASE FOR RADICAL REFoR- 61-85 (1969).
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arbitrary or capricious claims practices. These lawyers are able to
challenge the rigidities which inevitably afflict any institution, particularly
institutions which dispense money.' Under most no fault insurance
plans, victims would have to seek reparation from several sources, the
amount receivable from each source would be small and a dissatisfied
victim would still have to go to court to establish his right to benefits,
their amount and the source of payment. There would be less induce-
ment to consult an attorney and the likelihood of effective external
review of the actions of any single source would be decreased.
In the last few years concern with abuses of discretionary power
by administrative institutions has become popular.9 Low visibility ad-
ministrative and adjudicative decisions, such as those made by police
when deciding to arrest, are often challenged as arbitrary. 0 Similarly,
insurer cancellation and claims adjusting practices have been studied
and criticized, 1 Other compensation systems, such as workmen's com-
pensation and social security disability, have provided elaborate adjudica-
tive processes for resolving disputes. 2 Under most no fault plans, how-
ever, no similar review processes are contemplated; nor does O'Connell
suggest a way of providing such controls.
It may be true, as O'Connell suggests in his epilogue, that "techno-
logy is too important to be left to the technicians."'" However, a decision
to change a technology cannot be based merely upon a dislike for
technicians. Some technology and technicians must remain. The true
quest must be for appropriate limitations upon discretion to prevent
arbitrary and capricious actions. 4 So limited, technology will serve.
O'Connell also misleads by speaking of "the remedy of no-fault
insurance." Unless his reader has made a careful and independent study
of such disparate proposals as the New York plan, the Keeton-O'Connell
8. For a portrayal of the extent to which plaintiffs' attorneys act as a check,
from the adjuster's point of view, see Ross, supra note 5, at 56-86, 136-75.
9. See generally K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICES: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY
(1969).
10. See, e.g., A. BLUMBERG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1967); J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE
WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (1966).
11. S. REP. No. 91-326, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1968); S. REP. No. 188, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1967); S. REP. No. 1480, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.- 7-8 (1965).
12. See generally P. NONET, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE: ADVOCACY AND CHANGE
IN A GOVERNMENT AGENCY (1969); Haviland & Glomb, The Disability Insurance
Benefits Program and Low Income Claimants in Appalachia, 73 W. VA. L. REV. 109
(1971) ; Viles, The Social Security Administration Versus the Lawyers. . . and
Poor People Too (pts. 1-2), 39 Miss. L.J. 371, 40 id. at 24 (1968).
13. THE INJURY INDUSTRY, supra note 2, at 156.
14. For a study of the practices of insurance claims adjustments, see Ross,
supra note 5.
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plan, the American Insurance Association proposal and the Colter plan, 5
the assumption would be that no fault insurance reform is a unit."
O'Connell portrays a battle between "the fault system" on the one hand
and no fault on the other.' This is a false picture. There are many
proposals to modify the current system which do not abandon fault. The
uninformed reader, confronted in the media by a plethora of similar
appearing proposals, needs help in evaluating and selecting the best
possible compensation system. O'Connell might have provided yeoman
service had he discussed, compared and contrasted the various plans
for his lay audience.' He might have advocated the Keeton-O'Connell
plan and demonstrated how and why it responds to his criticisms of fault.
He might even have revealed his thoughts about the underlying social,
political and economic issues. O'Connell adopts none of these formats
but, instead, treats the debate over insurance reform as an either/or
proposition. The problem is not that simple; neither is the remedy.
From O'Connell's statements in The Injury Industry, the reader
would conclude that no fault insurance is a panacea. The author claims
a greater number of victims would receive more benefits from some form
of no fault insurance, while insurance purchasers would pay reduced
premiums.'" Unless the reader is rather sophisticated and knowledgeable,
he might regard this as the inevitable result of adopting some form of no
fault insurance. O'Connell's assertion is true, provided certain limitations
are made clear. O'Connell neither confronts these limitations, nor purports
to explore their implications for his readers.
No fault insurance can provide benefits more cheaply than liability
insurance. The savings occur in two major ways. Administrative costs
are reduced by reducing the expenses of litigation and claims adjustment.
The risks of doing so, however, have already been mentioned. Adminis-
trative costs will allegedly also be reduced by utilizing more efficient com-
pensation devices like health and accident insurance, workmen's com-
pensation and social security disability programs. O'Connell does not
15. For a review of and citation to various no fault plans, see Thorpe, Compen-
sation Reform, Accident Costs, and Traffic Safety: Toward a Unified Motor Trans-
port Policy, 46 IND. L.J. 301 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Thorpe].
16. See THE INJURY INDUSTRY, supra note 2, at 114-16.
,17. O'Connell does criticize plans developed by the National Association of
Independent Insurers and The American Mutual Insurance Alliance. Id. at 116-18.
Since both plans retain fault, the characterization in text is accurate.
18. O'Connell devotes approximately seven pages of text to a discussion of
no fault plans. Id. at 94-101. Appendix I contains a brief discussion of provisions for
property damage claims which might supplement the Keeton-O'Connell plan. Appendix
II contains recommendations for optional no fault insurance.
19. Id. at 106-21.
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make clear, however, that reallocating costs among existing compensatory
devices may not alter significantly the total costs.2" Auto insurance
premiums may be reduced, but the premium costs for maintenance of other
funds will rise. The expansion of health, accident or disability benefits
provided by a federal program will inevitably require a higher F.I.C.A.
tax. Any meaningful long-range cost reduction can be achieved only
through reducing the incidence and severity of accidents. -' It is not a
matter of devising a new accounting system.
No fault inurance, in short, is mislabeled a remedy for what ails our
compensation system. It should more properly be labeled an instrument,
a device for making our claims adjustment apparatus potentially more
economical and efficient. When so viewed, no fault insurance becomes
an attractive part of a larger reform package. That larger package,
however, should include proposals directed toward safer vehicles, better
roads, alternative forms of transport, modern licensing procedures, up-
to-date enforcement methods for moving traffic violations and a system
for regulating insurance rates and insurer cancellation and claims ad-
justing practices.22 Such a package might properly be labeled a remedy.
The problem with the debate over no fault insurance is the super-
ficiality of the dispute. I suspect that many citizens realize something is
wrong with the fault system. I further suspect they will support correc-
tives. However, I doubt that The Injury Industry and the Remedy of
No-Fault Insurance will assist the public in an analysis of the problems
of motor vehicle transport policies for this nation. If recalled from limbo
at all, it will be as the expos6 that failed-no mean feat in an era of
activist reforms and widespread exposure of the alleged evils of in-
stitutions.
PHILIP C. THORPEt
20. O'Connell discusses coverage duplications. Id. at 97-105. He does not discuss
the impact on costs of eliminating coverage duplications by shifting certain costs to
other forms of insurance.
21. See CALABRESI, supra note 5, at 26-31, 68-129; Thorpe, supra note 15, at
316-18.
22. See generally Thorpe, supra note 15.
t Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University.
The ideal system of traffic victim reparations would provide full
compensation to each injured motorist and pedestrian at the lowest
possible cost to society and its individual driving members. In The
